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Abstract
This paper analyses the location decisions of European multinational
￿rms across European countries and regions. Emphasis is placed on
whether location determinants and, in particular, the sign and strength of
agglomeration and dispersion forces change when looking at di⁄erent levels
of geographical aggregation. Our sample includes 4,803 foreign investment
projects established in 246 regions belonging to the 25 European Union
countries from 1998 to 2005. Preliminary results of conditional logit esti-
mations indicate that national and regional levels should be distinguished
when considering the location choices of multinationals. It appears that
agglomeration tendencies are more relevant at the regional level, while
dispersion forces are dominant at the country level.
JEL Classi￿cation: F23, R30, R58
Key words: Foreign direct investment, location choice, conditional
logit, European Union.
1 Introduction
There has been a growing interest in the location determinants and the spatial
distribution of foreign establishments. Increasing processes of regional integra-
tion, such as the European Union, not only reshape and a⁄ect the location
of economic activity but also foster foreign economic activity. Therefore, the
spatial distribution of economic activity is, to an increasing extent, determined
by the location decisions of multinationals ￿rms (MNEs). Moreover, regional
integration provides a natural experiment to analyse the location determinants
of MNEs. Changes in market size and transaction costs for example may a⁄ect
the pattern of MNEs￿location choices.
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1In addition, there may also be di⁄erences in the changes of location determi-
nants and their e⁄ects depending on the geographical scale considered. Again,
one characteristic of regional integration, particularly relevant for the European
context, is that countries and regions exist at the same time but they may pos-
sess very di⁄erent characteristics. Therefore, the geography of MNEs may di⁄er
depending on the spatial unit of analysis. This is important since attraction
of multinational activity is a policy concern not only for country but also for
regional authorities. Understanding the location process of multinationals, at
both levels, is crucial for adequate policy responses.
In the light of this, in this paper we investigate the location decisions of
MNEs across countries and regions in the European Union. Emphasis is placed
on whether location determinants, and in particular, the sign and strength of
agglomeration and dispersion forces change when looking at di⁄erent levels of
geographical aggregation. We expect to ￿nd di⁄erences between national and
regional levels because location determinants exhibit di⁄erent patterns depend-
ing on the geographical scale.
We seek to explain empirically how economic integration causes some multi-
national activity to locate in peripheral countries, leading to a dispersion process
at a supranational scale. The experience of Spain and Portugal since the mid
eighties and, more recently the CEEC1, con￿rms this pattern. However, when
the location decision is considered within a country, agglomeration tends to dom-
inate. The core regions within the host countries attract more foreign projects
than the rest of the regions. Altogether, the location of multinational activity in
Europe could be an additional mechanism explaining the evidence of a decrease
in the core-periphery pattern between European countries but an increase in
the core-periphery pattern within European countries (Puga 1999, Combes and
Overman 2003).
The location behaviour of MNEs has been analysed theoretically by di⁄erent
￿elds. International business (see, for example, Dunning 1993), trade theories
(see, for example, Markunsen 2002) and economic geography (see, for example,
Dicken 2003) are a rough classi￿cation of the main contributions. However,
there is no theory that addresses the geographical behaviour of MNEs (McCann
and Mudambi 2005). Hence, our question, which is based on the geographical
decision-making pattern of multinationals, is left to empirical investigation. Our
analysis takes into account all the existing theoretical approaches highlighting
the importance of a spatial analysis when considering how the location behaviour
of the MNE is in￿ uenced at di⁄erent spatial levels.
On the empirical side, we focus on the literature that speci￿cally deals with
the location determinants of MNEs. The majority of these studies are related to
a single country (see Crozet, Mayer et al. 2003, for the case of France; Coughlin
et al. 1991, for the case of USA; Guimaraes et al. 2000, for Portugal; Boudier-
Bensebaa 2005, for the case of Hungary). A few exceptional cases consider
simultaneously several countries and their regions within an economic integrated
context (Head and Mayer 2003, Disdier and Mayer 2004, Basile et al. 2003). In
general, however, these studies are primarily interested in testing the validity of
di⁄erent nested structures in which similarities among alternatives in the lower
level of aggregation can be taken into account. In the present paper the idea is
1Central and Eastern European countries: Czech Republic, Eslovenia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
2slightly di⁄erent. We are concerned about the right nested structure2 but our
main interest is to test if there are di⁄erences in the location determinants of
MNEs scale-dependent that could be an additional explanation to the decrease
in the core-periphery pattern between countries and the simultaneous increase
in the core-periphery pattern within countries in the European Union. Hence,
in this preliminary version, we only distinguish between countries and regions
in order to test for di⁄erences corresponding to di⁄erent spatial levels. That is,
some location determinants may have opposite e⁄ects when looking at di⁄erent
spatial levels, or be more relevant at one spatial level than another, or even only
be signi￿cant at one spatial level.
In this analysis we use conditional discrete logit family models of location
choices to assess which agglomeration and dispersion forces change and which
are dominant at di⁄erent geographical units. Our dataset includes 4;803 foreign
investment projects established in 246 regions (NUTS 2) belonging to the 25
European Union countries from 1998 to 2005. Preliminary results con￿rm that
national and regional levels should be distinguished when considering multina-
tionals￿location choices because determinants behave in a di⁄erent way and
therefore the resulting processes vary at both levels.
To our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst to consider all the EU countries
and their respective NUTS 2 regions3 in order to study the determinants of
location choices of MNEs. Therefore, we will be able to study not only the
spatial distribution of foreign activity across countries but also the outcomes
for individual countries within the economic integrated area of the European
Union. This study will contribute to the current literature ￿rstly by emphasizing
the existence of spatial dependencies on the location behaviour of multinational
￿rms which are not considered in existing theoretical explanations. Secondly, we
will be able to discriminate which location determinants change the e⁄ect of and
which ones are most relevant according to the spatial unit of analysis which may
be useful when designing policies to attract FDI. We also want to raise a policy
concern about the role of MNEs location decisions and their consequences in
a⁄ecting the European core-periphery pattern. Finally, from the multinational
￿rm perspective we expect to shed some light on the trade-o⁄ that they face
between core and peripheral regions in core and peripheral countries in order to
help make the most appropriate location choice.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we describe the
geography of MNEs across European countries and regions. In the following
section the econometric model is presented. Section 4 o⁄ers a description of the
data and variables included in our empirical model. The results are discussed
in section 5, and section 6 summarizes the principle conclusions.
2 The Geography of MNEs in the EU
In this section we describe the spatial distribution of multinational activity in the
European Union. First we present a discussion about the underlying theoretical
2In this preliminary version of the paper we do not check for the appropriate nested struc-
ture and assume that is based on regions as the lower level that belong to countries which
appear to be the most straight forward structure.
3Previous studies with two spatial levels have included NUTS 1 as the lower level. However,
we believe that NUTS 2 are the appropriate one since agglomeration e⁄ects are better captured
at small geographical units of observation.
3framework on which we base our analysis. We then describe the geography of
multinational activity in the EU at both national and regional levels of spatial
aggregation.
2.1 The underlying theory
The goal of this paper is to explain the spatial location behaviour of MNEs
at di⁄erent levels of geographical aggregation. Therefore, our empirical speci￿-
cation requires a theory describing the geographical pattern of multinationals￿
location choices. Theoretical analysis in this ￿eld can be roughly classi￿ed into
the following areas: international business literature, international trade theo-
ries, economic geography and location theories.
From an international business perspective, the OLI framework (Dunning
1977) is considered as the theoretical foundation of FDI. Location is viewed
as an advantage the ￿rm needs to have to become a multinational. However
it is built on a non-formal setting. To overcome this, the OLI framework is
consistently incorporated into general equilibrium trade models leading to the
so called knowledge capital approach of multinational ￿rm (see Markunsen 2002
for a review of these models). In this setting, location depends on country and
￿rm characteristics. In general, both approaches present some weaknesses from
our point of view. They draw theoretical predictions that can be mainly related
to country level studies of multinationals location choices and they lack an
explanation for existing agglomeration tendencies of foreign activity. Moreover,
according to Markunsen (2002) they remain aspatial.
In contrast to the above literature, economic geographers have generally
been interested in the geography of MNEs at subnational levels. Much of this
literature adopts traditional geography elements and applies them to the multi-
national ￿rm. For example, Dicken (2003) uses the product-cycle model of
Vernon (1966) to analyse the location of MNEs. Marshall￿ s agglomeration ideas
(1920) have also been incorporated to take into account the existing agglomera-
tion tendencies of FDI. However, no formal framework is built to test theoretical
predictions empirically.
With the advent of NEG (see Fujita, Krugman et al. 1999 for a review
of these models), traditional location theories4 and, more precisely, economies
due to proximity, are incorporated into a formal model. Moreover, the core-
periphery model (Krugman 1991) includes Marshall￿ s ideas into large industrial
areas and studies how economic integration a⁄ects the location of economic
activity. Nevertheless MNEs are ignored in these models. Recently, new theo-
retical developments (see, for example, Ekholm and Forslid 20015) incorporate
the knowledge capital approach into a NEG setting. They conclude that ten-
dencies towards agglomeration are reduced when introducing multi-plant ￿rms.
However, there is again a lack of a spatial structure distinguishing between
country and regional levels. This is in line with the idea by Neary (2001) who
notes that NEG setting seems to be scale independent.
Altogether, it appears that no single theory involved in the location process
of MNEs provides a coherent and adequate theoretical framework to study si-
4A review of location theories of production activities can be found in Beckman and Thisse
(1986).
5Other studies that incorporate multinational ￿rms into a NEG setting are Gao (1999) and
Raybaudi-Massilia (2000).
4multaneously the location behaviour of MNEs at both levels of geographical
aggregation. This is supported by a recent study by McCann and Mudambi
(2005) in which, from a literature review similar to ours, they conclude that
there is a lack of a geographical theory of the location decision making of MNEs.
Therefore, we incorporate the diverse elements from all the existing approaches
through a reduced form speci￿cation based on pro￿t maximization principles,
leaving the question of our interest left to empirical investigation.
In light of this discussion, we now look at the national and regional spatial
distribution of multinational activity to gain insight about the location processes
at work6.
2.2 The geography of MNEs at the country level
Figure 1. Here shows the average number of manufacturing foreign investment
per year (from 1997 to 2005) established in EU-25 countries as a share of the
national GDP7. The distribution of foreign investments at the country level
indicates that peripheral countries attract more investments than the ones they
should attract according to their GDP. This supports the idea of NEG models
that introduce multiplant ￿rms in which tendencies towards agglomeration are
weakened at a supranational scale.
We note from the map that CEEC are perceived by European MNEs as
attractive locations to establish their a¢ liates. They have optimized the oppor-
tunities of these countries characterised by privatization processes and incorpo-
ration to an integrated market while, at the same time, bene￿ting from their
location advantages such as lower labour costs. This idea is re￿ ected in the tran-
sition economies literature (see, for example, Sohinger 2005) which emphasises
the role of FDI in determining developmental patterns in these countries.
Other peripheral countries also successfully attract foreign investments. This
is the case of Portugal and Spain. However, Iberian countries, and particularly
Spain, seem to have lost some of their attractiveness because of the lower labour
costs of CEE countries (IMF 2004) or because of the larger market potential
of CEE countries (Turri￿n and VelÆzquez 2004). They are still important loca-
tions for international investment although the number of foreign projects they
received was higher in the earlier phases of their European integration.
Ireland and Greece are the last peripheral countries to be discussed. Ireland
has been quoted as a successful case in attracting FDI while Greece is men-
tioned as the contrary case. This is also shown by Figure 1. On one hand,
a combination of diverse factors are raised as the reasons for the Irish success
("Celtic Tiger"). Not only has European integration played a role but also a
favourable corporation tax regime, low wages and high educational level of the
labour force, cultural linkages with the United States and United Kingdom, an
ideal institutional framework, etc., are some of the other features contributing
to its success (Barry 2003). On the other hand, European integration does not
seem to have greatly a⁄ected the attraction of foreign activity into Greece nor
has the development of incentive policies appeared to be enough to o⁄set the
unfavourable Greek conditions in order to attract FDI. This is re￿ ected in the
6In this descriptive analysis we use a dataset of foreign investment projects of European
multinational ￿rms described in Section 4 in more detail.
7By dividing the yearly average number of foreign investments located in each country by
the GDP of the country the size-e⁄ect is removed.
5"inward FDI index" (UNCTAD 2001) which indicates that Greece attracts less
FDI than would be expecetd.
In relation to the rest of the EU countries, France and the UK attract the
highest number of foreign investments across Europe (see Table 1). However,
when we control for market size their relative attractiveness is reduced. Italy
and Germany do not appear to be popular as locations for multinational ￿rms.
Both the total number of investments (see Table 1) and the average number of
locations per year controlled by market size (see Figure 1) indicate that they are
not considered to be attractive locations for foreign projects. Table 1 provides
a more detailed information about the total distribution of foreign projects of
our sample by year and by country.
Overall we have shown that there is evidence to think about the presence
of a process of delocalization in the European market through the location of
manufacturing a¢ liates of European multinational ￿rms.
2.3 The geography of MNEs at the regional level
Given the pattern in the spatial distribution of multinational activity at a na-
tional level, the next question is if the same process is happening within coun-
tries. The map in Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of manufacturing multi-
national activity at the regional level (NUTS 2). Here, the regional share of the
average number of foreign investment per year from 1997 to 2005 is mapped
with respect to the total number established in the country. We observed that,
in general, the core regions within each country attract the most foreign invest-
ment projects. Hence, it appears that tendencies towards agglomeration are
fostered within countries favouring a core-periphery pattern within countries in
contrast to what is observed at the supranational scale.
In CEE countries the general pattern is that the capital regions and the re-
gions situated near the border with Western Europe receive the highest shares of
manufacturing foreign investments. These regions are also considered the core
regions of each country. A similar pattern takes place in the Iberian countries.
Madrid and Cataluna in Spain and Lisbon and Norte (Porto) in Portugal are
the regions which attract the most foreign investments. Italy also represents an-
other example of a clear core-periphery pattern, with the region of Lombardia
accumulating the majority of the investments. In the UK and France a more
disparate pattern emerges. Some regions situated in Scotland and Wales (UK)
and Lorraine and Rhode-Alpes in France have a similar share of foreign invest-
ments to the core regions of London and Paris respectively. However, we need
to bear in mind that if we were to consider service activities, then London and
Paris would clearly be the most preferred locations within these two countries.
Overall it can be said that a core-periphery pattern is reinforced within
European countries when considering the location of foreign investments. In
order to empirically assess the opposing patterns encountered at the country
and regional levels and determine the behaviour of the location determinants
causing them, we turn to conditional discrete choice models.
63 Econometric Model
In this paper, we estimate a model of location choices of individual Euro-
pean multinational ￿rms over a set of 25 European countries and their regions
(NUTS2) during the period 1997-2005. There is a general agreement to use the
conditional logit model (CLM) proposed by McFadden (1984) to model location
decisions since they are discrete choices made among several alternatives.
Suppose that, at time t, a decision maker labelled n faces a set of J alterna-
tives where J = (1;:::;j;:::l) which is, in our setting, the set of possible location
countries or regions. At t, each ￿rm i obtains a pro￿t ￿jt from location j such
that:
￿jt = Vjt + "jt; (1)
where Vjt = ￿Xjt; that is, a function of observable characteristics (Xjt) of
each location choice j and a vector of coe¢ cients ￿ to be estimated and "jt the
unobservable advantage of location j. At time t, ￿rm i will locate in region j
if this location o⁄ers a higher pro￿t than all the other alternatives. Therefore,
the probability of choosing location j is:
Pjt ￿ Prob(￿jt > ￿kt) = Prob("kt < "jt + ￿(Xjt ￿ Xkt));8k 6= j: (2)
Under the assumption of independent and identically distributed error terms








It can be demonstrated that the log-likelihood function with these choice
probabilities is globally concave in parameters ￿ and thus can be estimated
readily. In addition, CLM is characterised by the assumption of Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and consequently the ratio of the logit probabilities
for any two alternatives j and k does not depend on any alternatives other than
j and k.
In future versions of the paper, we plan to estimate nested logit models8.
This will allow us ￿rstly to relax the IIA assumption and consider the fact that
regions within a country are likely to be more similar to each other than to
regions in other countries. In addition, nested estimations will provide us with
a more accurate interpretation in order to distinguish multinationals￿location
patterns between countries and within the countries. However, nested estima-
tions require an adequate choice of nested structure according to the location
decision-making process carried out by MNEs. We assume a geographical se-
quence in this decision process but di⁄erent nested structures must to be tested
8Also we plan to extend the model by accounting for ￿rm heterogeneity in the location
decision process by estimating a mixed logit model. In addition, we will estimate a model
considering both autocorrelation among alternatives and ￿rm heterogeneity. This will be
carried out by estimating a mixed nested logit model.
7in order to ￿nd the most representative one. In the present version of the paper
we consider location choices between countries and between regions separately.
The simplicity of CLM allows us a ￿rst insight into the behaviour of location
determinants at di⁄erent spatial levels since we can compare CLM estimations
from a model considering location choices between European countries with
CLM estimations from a model considering location choices between European
regions.
4 Speci￿cation of the model and data descrip-
tion
Following the existing literature about the location behaviour of the multina-
tional ￿rm and pro￿t maximization priciples, a theoretical pro￿t equation is
translated to a CLM pro￿t equation using a linear speci￿cation of the pro￿t
function. From 3:
￿jt = Vjt + "jt = ￿Xjt + "jt; (4)
where Xjt is a vector of country or regional characteristics and ￿ is a vector
of coe¢ cients to be estimated. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if a
given a¢ liate n was created at time t in region j and zero otherwise. All the
explanatory variables are lagged one period with respect to the year when the
location decision of each observation was implemented. In other words, if we
assume that a rational ￿rm locating an a¢ liate in year t and in location j makes
the decision based on the characteristics of j in t ￿ 1, then:
￿jt = Vjt￿1 + "jt = ￿Xjt￿1 + "jt; (5)
In the next subsections we explain in detail the dataset used for our depen-
dent variable and the choice of explanatory variables.
4.1 Dependent variable
The construction and analysis of our dependent variable is based on a dataset
that includes more than 17;000 foreign investment projects from all over the
world established in European countries from 1997 up today. The information
was compiled from the European Investment Monitor9. Each company project is
recorded individually and contains information about the year when the project
announcement took place, the parent company and parent country, industrial
sector, function of the investment and host country, host region and host city.
For some observations the size of the investment as indicated by number of jobs
created is also recorded.
This database only considers projects that are real creations, extensions or
co-locations of already existing real projects, that is, green￿eld investments10.
It excludes mergers, acquisitions, licence agreements and joint ventures. Hence,
it allows us to focus only on the location determinants which relate to a speci￿c
type of entry mode. This is important because there is evidence that location
9European Investment Monitor is a dataset produced by Ernst & Young.
10It also includes joint ventures in cases that involved an extension or a new plant creation.
8determinants and spatial distribution may vary according to the mode of entry
of the investment (Basile 2004, HuallachÆin and Reid 1997).
From this dataset we select foreign investment projects that ful￿l the fol-
lowing requirements. Firstly, we restrict our analysis to those projects that are
located in the 25 European Union countries since changes may occur due to
regional integration. In addition, only European Union multinationals￿projects
are included in our sample11. This allows us to concentrate on intra-EU FDI
which has not received much attention in the existing literature (Barba-Navaretti
and Venables 2004). Finally, only manufacturing a¢ liates are selected. Primary
sector foreign investments seem to be characterised mainly by where the nat-
ural resources for those investments are located and therefore they will bias
our analysis. Service foreign investment also seem to be biased towards big or
capital cities.
At the end, our sample includes 4;803 manufacturing foreign investment
projects established in 246 regions12 belonging to the 25 European Union coun-
tries from 1998 to 2005.
4.2 Independent variables
The independent variables are grouped into four categories: market demand
variables, labour market variables, agglomeration variables and other variables
of interest. These categories correspond to the classical location determinants13
that are argued to be the principal motives for multinationals￿location choices
in the existing literature. Both national and regional variables are included for
the three ￿rst categories of variables while other variables of interest are only
considered at national level. A description of all variables used in our empirical
speci￿cation is shown in Table 2.
4.2.1 Market demand variables
Multinational ￿rms are traditionally attracted to those markets where they can
pro￿t from great demand. Existing studies use di⁄erent measures to proxy
this location motive but the most frequent variable is GDP (Woodward 1992,
Braunerhjelm and Svenson 1996, Head et al. 1999). This is a proxy for internal
market potential demand. Following Harris (1954) we include the e⁄ect of ex-
ternal market potential demand which has also been found to be an important
location determinant (Crozet et al. 2003, Basile et al. 2003). In our speci￿c
context, this latter variable is crucial since we are considering intra-European
foreign investment projects located in an economically integrated area. There-
fore, MNEs are likely to consider not only the internal market of the country
or region where they decide to locate but also all the other markets included in
the European Union.
11The increase in inward FDI in Europe during the 1990s was mainly due to an increase in
intra-EU FDI (Eurostat 2004) and hence, we do not think that chosing only intra-EU FDI
will restrict a lot our analysis. In future versions we plan to include extra-EU foreign projects
such as American and Japanese ones.
12French overseas regions and Madeira and A￿ores regions in Portugal are not included
in the set of our location choices because of the lack of data to account for their location
characteristics.
13In reality location determinants are a combination between ￿rm and location character-
istics. Future versions of the paper will include ￿rm characteristics as additional location
determinants.
9More precisely, our external market potential variable is the sum of the GDPs










Our interest is to evaluate whether these market demand variables behave
di⁄erently depending on the spatial unit of analysis. In general, at large geo-
graphical scales there is a market-seeking motive of foreign direct investment
coming from the OLI framework of multinational activity (Dunning 1993). In
addition, under regional integration contexts, NEG modelling emphasizes the
fact that ￿rms tend to locate where demand is found, thus generating a core-
periphery pattern (Krugman 1991). However, when the existence of multi-plant
￿rms is introduced in a NEG setting, tendencies towards agglomeration weaken
(Ekholm and Forslid 2001). In an integrated economic area MNEs do not nec-
essarily locate their a¢ liates near the highest potential market demand. They
can take advantage of decreasing transport costs and locate in low production
cost areas and therefore be compensated for a loss in potential market demand.
Turning to small geographical units of analysis, in our case European Nuts
2 regions, market-seeking motives may be at work as well. Moreover, even in
cases where there is no market-seeking motive, MNEs may still be attracted
to locations characterised by high demand. Following NEG models, economic
activity follows demand is and the demand is where the workers are. Hence,
regions with higher GDPs may signal the availability of a large pool of work-
ers. However, it is reasonable to think that the market-seeking location motive
is weaker, or even non existent, since the region where the foreign project is
established is unlikely to be the only market served by the multinational.
Altogether, there is no clear direction about the sign and strength of the
in￿ uence of internal market potential at both spatial levels. Therefore, a larger
internal market potential at both country and regional level may positively
or negatively in￿ uence the location of foreign investment projects. Empirical
results are required to solve these opposite arguments.
External market potential is also considered in order to take into account
the e⁄ect of the geographical location of the country and regional alternatives.
MNEs serve not only the internal market where they decide to locate but also
the rest of the European market. Hence, we expect countries with high exter-
nal market potential to be attractive locations. For example, if a multinational
decides to invest in an European peripheral country, under the same circum-
stances, the foreign project is likely to be established in the country with the
highest external market potential15. At a regional level this in￿ uence appears
to be more relevant. NUTS 2 regions are too small a geographical unit to be
the only market served by the foreign ￿rm established there. Therefore, exter-
nal market potential is the appropriate proxy to measure any type of market
potential at this geographical unit of analysis.
We expect that external market potential at both country and regional level
14The distance is calculated with the great circle formula using the latitude and longitude
of the main cities in each country and in each region.
15It is argued that one of the reasons in￿uencing the transfer of foreign investment projects
from the Iberian peninsula to the CEE countries is that the latter enjoy from greater external
market potential given their geographical location in relation to Spain and Portugal.
10is likely to act as an attracting force for the location of multinationals￿a¢ liates
although the e⁄ect will be greater at the regional level.
A third market potential variable is included. It can be said that GDP is
not the right proxy for potential internal market since it may be biased by a
scale e⁄ect. That is, geographical areas characterized by a large population are
likely to have higher GDP simply because of their size. In order to correct for
this GDP per capita is included in our empirical model.
4.2.2 Labour market variables
Apart from the demand side determinants, location of foreign investments are
also motivated by production costs re￿ ected in labour market conditions. Labour
market conditions have generally been included in the literature of multina-
tionals￿location choices by including measures of wages and unemployment.
However, the empirical evidence is somewhat inconclusive. Some studies ￿nd
a positive correlation between labour costs and FDI (Guimaraes et al. 2000,
Head et al. 1999) while others ￿nd a negative in￿ uence (Coughlin et al. 1991,
Bartik 1985). We attempt to measure labour conditions through wages de￿ned
as hour cost per employee and unemployment rate to look for di⁄erences in their
in￿ uence at di⁄erent spatial units of analysis.
Wages appear to have a double e⁄ect that may be present at both country
and regional levels. On the one hand, there is the resource-seeking motive of
FDI raised by Dunning (1993). If we measure production costs by wages, the
theoretical prediction is that wages are negatively related to pro￿ts and hence,
to locations. Furthermore, incentives to agglomerate are reduced as trade costs
fall and labour cost considerations become more important than agglomeration
forces under regional integration contexts (Gao 1999). However, on the other
hand, labour costs may re￿ ect the availability of skilled workers. If this is the
case, higher wages signalling the availavility of skilled workers will positively
in￿ uence the location of foreign investment projects. Hence, higher wages can
either encourage or deter the location of multinational activities at both country
and regional geographical units of analysis.
Unemployment levels may also have a positive or negative in￿ uence on the lo-
cation choices of MNEs. A high unemployment rate may indicate, on one hand,
a lack of suitable workers16 (Bartik 1985) or the existence of labour rigidities
(Disdier and Mayer 2004) and hence will negatively in￿ uence the location of for-
eign ￿rms. On the other hand, it is also possible to explain a positive e⁄ect of
high unemployment rate in the location decisions of MNEs. A high unemploy-
ment rate may signal the existence of a large available workforce (Woodward
1992). There is no general agreement about this and the evidence is mixed.
Thus, a high unemployment rate can be either a dispersion or an agglomera-
tion force when considering location choices at country and regional levels of
geographical aggregation.
Overall, all the possible results are supported by plausible theories. We
expect to ￿nd some di⁄erences depending on the spatial unit of analysis in the
empirical results and hence, shed some light on the inconclusive results that
16A complementary variable that could measure this e⁄ect is educational level. Higher
unemployement rates may mean not having the appropriate worforce, that is, a well-educated
labour force. Therefore, MNEs prefer core locations because they are expected to have a more
educated population, hence lower unemployment rates.
11appear in the existing literature. We also expect the empirical results relative
to labour variables to support our general hyphothesis of a dispersion process
at supranational scale with an agglomeration process within countries.
4.2.3 Agglomeration variables
The seminal work by Alfred Marshall (1920) establishes the generally accepted
explanations for manufacturing agglomeration. Agglomeration generates some
form of economies due to proximity and is the result of a combination of di⁄erent
factors: labour market pooling, proximity of non-traded goods, and technologi-
cal spillovers. Contributions such as new trade theory and new economic geogra-
phy have expressed these ideas in formal general equilibrium models. Following
this, manufacturing MNEs are attracted to those areas where they can enjoy the
presence of existing manufacturing activity and bene￿t from the agglomeration
economies that may be generated.
Several studies have investigated the importance of agglomeration economies
as a determinant of location choice and all ￿nd a positive relationship. In
particular, focusing on those studies that analyse the multinationals￿location
choices, several proxies have been used to measure this e⁄ect. Ideally, we should
follow Head et al. (1995) who argue that agglomeration economies can be more
accurately analysed by allowing for di⁄erent measures according to the type
of the agglomeration. In this preliminary study we only consider two types:
foreign agglomeration and overall manufacturing agglomeration.
The foreign agglomeration variable attempts to capture foreign agglomera-
tion economies that emerge for non observable reason. This idea is also men-
tioned in Head and Mayer (2003) who note that "the backward linkage of NEG
mechanism might not be the only driver of clustering behaviour by MNEs".
The main non observable reasons that cause multinational activity to agglom-
erate can be summarize in four reasons: (1) MNEs face more uncertainty than
local ￿rms in their location choice process and therefore, locations where a high
number of MNEs are already established may be a signal that the location is
a good one, thus reducing the associated uncertainty. (2) Establishing a plant
in a foreign market is costly. Not only are there costs associated with the real
implementation of the plant but also previous costs. For example, MNEs need
to contract strategy services in order to select adequate locations or spend time
analysing di⁄erent alternatives and then decide. However, MNEs may act as
free riders and avoid these costs by locating in areas where other MNEs are
already established. (3) Foreign ￿rms may want to locate where other for-
eign ￿rms already exist because of demonstration e⁄ects (Decoster and Strange
1993). That is, ￿rms follow their competitors in order to keep pace. (4) Finally,
there might be a rent-seeking motive. Both MNEs and public o¢ cials in core
locations may agree in some type of rent to ine¢ ciently a⁄ect the location of
foreign investment favouring agglomeration.
We measure this following Head et al. (1995) who de￿ne foreign agglom-
eration17 as the sum plus one of the number of foreign projects located in the
region or country the year before the location decision of a new investment and
expect to ￿nd that a higher presence of foreign ￿rms in an area (either country
or region) positively in￿ uences the attraction of other foreign ￿rms.
17In forthcoming versions of this research we will be able to include a sectoral foreign
agglomeration variable to account for industry speci￿c foreign agglomeration economies.
12Our second agglomeration measure is thought to account for the rest of the
of agglomeration e⁄ects, that is, as de￿ned by Marshall. This is proxied by
the total manufacturing employment per square kilometer. We think that this
variable is most related to the labour pooling type of agglomeration economies.
Localization economies accounting for forward and backward linkages are dif-
￿cult to measure due to the lack of comparable sectoral disaggregated data at
country and regional level in the European Union. To proxy for knowledge
spillovers, a more precise measure would be necessary. However, the presence
of many competitors in the area may also act as a deterrent to the location of
new foreign investments. In highly manufacturing populated areas not only are
￿rms competing in the product market but also in the factor markets, making
the production process more costly. Taking all these ideas into consideration, we
￿nd again a double possible e⁄ect that needs to be solved empirically. A strong
presence of manufacturing industries may in￿ uence either positively or nega-
tively the entrance of foreign investment projects at both country and regional
levels .
Finally, a third control variable is added: population density. The argument
that it represents is, not only a measure of agglomeration but also a measure
of congestion. Following Guimaraes et al. (2000), population density can be
used as a proxy for industrial land costs. Here we think about this variable
in the sense that high industrial land costs in highly populated areas act as a
dispersion force. On the other hand, population density may be indicative of
an adequate networking environment or a large available pool of workers. Since
MNEs also care about this, they value locations with high population density.
In the light of this, population density can negatively or positively in￿ uence the
location of multinationals ￿rms at both country and regional levels.
According to the three agglomeration hypotheses, either result is possible.
We expect to ￿nd in the empirical results di⁄erences in some of these agglom-
eration location determinants at di⁄erent spatial levels. This may also re￿ ect
the fact that they can be better measured at either country or regional level.
4.2.4 Other variables of interest
Other location determinants need to be considered in order to control for the
many issues that multinational ￿rms take into consideration in their location
choices. Here, we control for institutional quality and level of corporate taxes.
Multinational ￿rms are attracted by countries with good governance quality and
low corporate taxes. A country with a good governance signals a good environ-
ment in which to do business since policies emerge for the bene￿t of an adequate
political, social and economic environment. At the same time, a country with
low corporate taxes reduces the production costs of any economic activity and
therefore is an important factor that MNEs consider when deciding where to
locate. Given this and taking into consideration that these two variables are
only at national level, we expect to ￿nd that the better the governance e⁄ec-
tiveness and the lower the corporate tax rate the better conditions for a country
to attract foreign direct investments.
According to the di⁄erent arguments about the location determinants at
both national and regional level we expect dispersive forces to be a stronger
in￿ uence in the multinationals￿location process when considering location al-
ternatives at a supra national level. On the other hand, we expect agglomeration
13forces to dominate when the location choices are at a regional geographical level
within individual countries. Therefore, these geographical considerations in the
location decison process of MNEs can be an additional mechanism through
which the decrease in the core-periphery pattern between European countries
but increase in the core-periphery pattern within European countries can be
explained.
All explanatory variables are in logs, with the exception of the governance
index which is not a continuous variable, and are lagged one period. The reasons
for the latter transformation are the following: (1) multinationals￿decisions
choices take some time to be implemented, (2) foreign agglomeration economies
will only be at work if there have been previous foreign ￿rms in the area for some
time, and ￿nally, (3) by lagging the explanatory variables we reduce endogeneity
bias.
5 Empirical results
Table 3 presents the estimation results concerning the determinants of location
choice at country level (columns 1 and 2), at regional level (columns 3 and 4)
and at regional level with country attributes (column 5). In general, the di⁄er-
ent determinants have the expected signs and their magnitudes are consistent
with comparable existing work using logit models of location choice. All con-
tinuous variables are in logs so that the coe¢ cients are approximations of the
elasticity of the probability of choosing a particular location with respect to the
explanatory variable for the average investor. The overall ￿ts of the estimations
are consistent with those found in comparable papers.
5.1 Country level results
Regarding estimation results at the country level (columns 1 and 2 in Table 3),
location choice is in￿ uenced positively by market potential variables. Countries
characterized by both large internal and external potential demand are consid-
ered to be attractive locations for European manufacturing multinational ￿rms.
Although location choice is positively in￿ uenced by where the demand is, this
might be capturing the fact that countries such as the UK and France are leading
locations for foreign projects. This does not necessarily go against our general
hypothesis, since we argue that economic integration fosters some multinational
activity in peripheral countries. It also appears that external market potential
is more relevant than internal one. This is reasonable within our setting since
European MNEs are likely to sell their products to the entire European market.
Our estimated coe¢ cient indicates that a country that experiences a 10% rise
in its external market potential increases its probability of being chosen in the
future by a 3,7%. In order to control for a possible size e⁄ect we include GDP
per capita in the model. However this variable is insigni￿cant.
The labour market variable results resolve the ambiguity of their e⁄ect dis-
cussed preciously (see section 4). Wages have a signi￿cant adn negative in￿ u-
ence on location choice. Therefore, wages levels act as a dispersion force at the
country level indicating that MNEs tend to locate their a¢ liates in low produc-
tion cost countries. Unemployment rate has a positive sign but is not signi￿cant
14which con￿rms the di¢ culty experienced by previous studies to establish a clear
relationship between unemployment rate and location choices.
Turning to the e⁄ect of agglomeration variables, manufacturing density neg-
atively in￿ uences multinationals￿location choices. This supports the idea of a
delocalisation process from core countries su⁄ering from competitive pressures
to peripheral countries. Although this variable is not signi￿cant, it is logical to
think that the existence of this competition e⁄ect at country level rather than
the explanation which relates this variable with a measure of manufacturing
positive externalities. This may be due not only because of the sign obtained
but also due to the fact that the proxy used is a very vague measure to capture
these type of economies.
Previous locations of foreign projects have a strong, positive and signi￿cant
in￿ uence. This indicates the relevance of non observable reasons in the location
of multinationals. A 10% increase in previous foreign locations in a country
raises the probability of being chosen by approximately 8,2%. Finally, popula-
tion density is not signi￿cant. We believe this indicates that this variable, at
country level, does not capture the e⁄ects it was intended to capture. Because
of this, we drop this variable and the new results are shown in column 2 in
Table3. The only mentionable change is that our manufacturing density vari-
able now becomes signi￿cant. The rest of the variables have the same signs and
signi￿cances.
As was expected, there is a negative and signi￿cant relationship between the
level of corporate taxes and location choices. Our control variable for institu-
tional quality, governance index, is not signi￿cant.
Overall, country level estimation provides evidence of a dispersion tendency
in the European Union through the location of European multinationals￿a¢ li-
ates. Location determinants expected to behave in a particular direction have
the expected signs: external market potential, foreign agglomeration, taxes. In
relation to the trade-o⁄between agglomeration and dispersion forces, it appears
that the negative in￿ uence of wages is stronger than the positive in￿ uence of
internal market potential as is shown in the value of their estimated coe¢ cients
(-0,377 versus 0,214 respectively). That is, when trade costs are reduced, such as
in the European Union, incentives to agglomerate are also reduced and labour-
costs considerations become more important than agglomeration forces. This is
line with the conclusions of NEG models that include multiplant ￿rms (see, for
example, Gao 1999).
5.2 Regional level results
To investigate whether the in￿ uence of each location determinant remains the
same when we change the spatial unit of analysis, our ￿rst approach is to es-
timate the same location decisions at the regional level (NUTS 2) and hence,
introduce explanatory variables measured at regional level. Then we compare
our country estimations with the regional ones.
The results at the regional level correspond to the values shown in columns
3 and 4 of Table 3. Potential market variables appear to have the same sign and
signi￿cance pattern observed at the country level. That is, when multinationals
consider the set of possible European regions as location alternatives, they prefer
regions with a large internal and external market potential. Nevertheless it is
important to notice that the strength of the relationship between internal market
15potential and location choice is much weaker than at the country level. This
means that European MNEs are concerned with the entire EU market and thus
the relationship is weaker at the regional level given that regional units are very
di¢ cult to be only considered as the market where ￿rms are going to sell their
products. Hence, external market potential better captures potential demand
e⁄ects. Moreover, GDP per capita appears to be insigni￿cant which supports
the previous idea. Column 4 presents the results excluding this variable.
The e⁄ect of labour market variables are similar to country level results.
Unemployment rate continues to be insigni￿cant and wages have a signi￿cant
and negative e⁄ect on location choices. That is, a 10% increase in the wages
of a region reduces the probability of being chosen in the future by 2,7%. It is
important to note that this result highlights an interpretation problem. Since
we have conditional logit estimations over the entire set of European regions,
the negative e⁄ect of wages is reasonable. The e⁄ect found is a measure of the
advanatge of those European regions with lower labour costs. We are not able to
capture the e⁄ect we are really interested in, namely the e⁄ect of wages within
countries.
Agglomeration variables appear to have the expected signs supporting our
hypothesis that agglomeration tendencies dominate when studying multination-
als￿location choices at the regional level. Again, foreign agglomeration due to
non observable reasons has a signi￿cant positive in￿ uence on the location choices
at the regional level. Manufacturing density has a positive e⁄ect, in contrast to
the negative e⁄ect at the country level, but the e⁄ect is insigni￿cant. Therefore,
it is measuring the positive e⁄ect of positive economies favouring agglomeration
rather than capturing competition e⁄ects. In future versions of this paper we
plan to include more appropriate measures for more conclusive analysis.
Population density has become a signi￿cant variable at the regional level
con￿rming our previous result that it is a relevant measure at small geographi-
cal units of analysis. However, we experience the same interpretation problem
we observed with wages. Since we are considering the entire set of European
regions without any spatial structure, population density captures the negative
in￿ uence of industrial land prices in the location of foreign projects. In contrast,
we are not able to capture any possible agglomeration tendencies indicated by
population density when we consider location choices within countries.
Altogether, location determinants exhibit di⁄erent in￿ uences when measur-
ing them at the regional level. This is re￿ ected in the change in the sign of
manufacturing density and also in the fact that some e⁄ects appear to be mea-
sured more accurately at one speci￿c geographical scale. For example, inter-
nal market potential is more appropriate for country geographical scales while
population density is more appropriate at regional level. However, there is an
interpretation problem. We are not able to distinguish possible opposite e⁄ects
in the in￿ uence of location determinants, and particularly, in agglomeration and
dispersion forces, when considering location choices between countries with re-
spect to location choices within countries. This may be the reason why potential
demand and labour cost variables in￿ uence location choices in the same manner
at both geographical levels. This is due to the fact that we use conditional logit
models without any geographical structure in the location decision making of
the MNEs. In order to account for this a nested logit estimation is required.
Moreover, the choice of an appropriate nested geographical structure needs to
16be tested. Further research is therefore required in this line18.
In order to solve part of this problem, we estimate a conditional logit model
as a second approach to give some insight into possible di⁄erences in the in￿ u-
ence of multinationals￿location determinants depending on the spatial unit of
analysis.
5.3 Country and regional level results
We again estimate a conditional logit of location choices at the regional level but
this time introduce location determinants measured at the country level. Col-
umn 5 in Table 3 presents the estimated coe¢ cients. This alternative approach
complements the previous analysis in order to test for spatial dependencies in
the location determinants of MNEs. Here, the strategy is to compare the two
estimated coe¢ cients (country and regional) for each location determinant.
The ￿rst thing to note is that we have only included a country measure of
GDP per capita and a regional measure of population density. This is because
previous estimations indicate that these are the appropriate spatial scales for
these variables. Results are similar to what has already been commented in
previous estimations.
In addition, there are two variables that can only be taken into account at
country level. Corporate taxes appear to have a signi￿cant negative in￿ uence
on location choices while the index of governance positively and signi￿cantly
in￿ uences the location of foreign projects. These results match our expectations
as discussed in section 4.
According to the discussion in section 4 di⁄erences in the behaviour of for-
eign agglomeration variables depending on the geographical scale taken into
consideration were not expected. This is con￿rmed by results in this last es-
timation and in the previous ones. Previous foreign location positively a⁄ects
the location of foreign projects regardless of the geographical unit of analysis.
However, results certainly show a consistent spatial divergent behaviour of the
manufacturing density measure. It seems that manufacturing density negatively
in￿ uences multinationals￿location choices at the country level favouring a dis-
persion process while, at the same time, positively in￿ uences multinationals￿
location choices at a regional level fostering agglomeration tendencies.
Estimated coe¢ cients of the labour market variables present clarifying re-
sults. In this last estimation, the impossibility of estimating a signi￿cant e⁄ect
of the unemployment rate is con￿rmed. We conclude that there is no clear rela-
tionship between unemployment rate and location choices at any of the spatial
levels considered. We obtain again a negative e⁄ect of wages at the country
level which supports the delocation process at a supranational scale. However
the e⁄ect at the regional level is insigni￿cant. We argue that ￿rms consider the
wage level as a determinant to locate in a cheaper country but within a country
it has no e⁄ect19. At the regional level wages may be signalling educational
18A nested logit estimation was done with country and regional levels but inclusive values
were not signi￿cant. Hence, these results are not included in the present paper and further
research is needed to ￿nd the adequate geographical structure.This is in line with Basile et al.
(2003) who conclude that national boundaries do not seem to a⁄ect multinationals￿location
decisions.
19A similar idea is raised in Figuereido et al. (2002). They say that ￿rms consider the wage
level as a determinant to locate in a cheaper country but within a country it has no e⁄ect.
17levels instead of labour costs. Hence, in order to take into account this e⁄ect, a
better proxy would be necessary in future versions.
Finally, and in relation to market variables, we obtain that external market
potential behaves in the same way at the country and regional level which
con￿rms the similar behaviour found in previous estimations. When looking at
model 5, comparison of country and regional GDP leads to an opposite e⁄ect.
It appears that multinationals do not worry about national internal market
potentials since they operate under an economic integrated area and hence can
delocate some activity to countries with lower internal demand. At the regional
level, internal demand matters. However it is important to notice that the
interpretation of the internal market demand variables varies respect the one
when comparing models 2 and 4. Previously, we conclude that country GDP
has a stronger positive e⁄ect than regional GDP due to the fact that the market
served by foreign ￿rms is rarely limited to their regional location choice. In
model 5 we may want to interpret the di⁄erence with national GDP in the
sense that multinationals prefer regions where the demand is high because those
regions have the largest labour pool following NEG theory.
Overall, we ￿nd evidence of a divergent behaviour of location determinants
depending on the spatial scale taken into account. Firstly, there are some loca-
tion determinants that are only at work at one spatial scale (population density,
GDP per capita, wages). This means that some location determinants should
be measured only at the appropriate geographical unit of analysis. Secondly,
some determinants have opposite e⁄ects when measured at di⁄erent level of ag-
gregation (manufacturing density, GDP). This is due either because the e⁄ects
they proxy certainly behave in opposite directions at the two spatial levels or
because the e⁄ects they proxy change depending on the unit of analysis. And
￿nally, some e⁄ects behave in similar directions, however the strength of the
relationship di⁄ers depending on whether it is considered at the country level
or the regional level (market potential variables).
To summarize, our econometric estimations concerning the location choice
of EU multinational ￿rms in EU countries and regions from 1998 to 2005 indi-
cate that some location determinants behave in a divergent way depending on
whether they account for country or regional e⁄ects. The estimation results,
suggest that economic integration fosters some multinational activity to locate
in peripheral countries due to a dispersion process. However, tendencies towards
agglomeration are reinforced at a regional level.
Caution should be used when analysing these preliminary results. Some in-
terpretation problems are faced because with conditional logit estimations we
cannot take into account any spatial structure. A more precise speci￿cation is
necessary in future versions to distinguish the divergent e⁄ects of economic vari-
ables at the country and regional level. Future extentions should involve nested
models to look for an appropriate geographical structure in the decision making
process of MNEs. In addition, future work should include ￿rm characteristics
and account for ￿rm heterogeneity through estimation of mixed logit models.
6 Conclusion
We analyse the determinants of location choices by European multinationals
in the European Union. We attempt to study how foreign activity is spatially
18distributed not only across countries but also in individual countries within an
economic integration context. Our attention is particularly concerned with the
behaviour of the location determinants at the country level versus the behaviour
of the same location determinants at the regional level. The underlying pro￿t
equation incorporates agglomeration and dispersion location determinants at
both levels of geographical aggregation. Using conditional logit discrete estima-
tions we determine whether the location determinants of MNEs change when
looking at di⁄erent spatial units of analysis.
Preliminary results support the idea of a divergent e⁄ect of location deter-
minants depending on the geographical unit of analysis. At the country level,
dispersion determinants such as wages play a major role. This favours the delo-
cation of economic activity to peripheral countries within the EU through the
location of European multinationals a¢ liates. On the other hand, agglomera-
tion determinants tend to dominate at the regional level. For example, both
external market potential and foreign agglomeration for non observable reasons
have a stronger positive in￿ uence at the regional level.
We ￿nd empirical evidence supporting the idea that agglomeration tenden-
cies are weaken when multinationals￿location choices are considered under re-
gional integration contexts. In addition, we ￿nd empirical support that the
opposite is likely to happen when regions are the choices of the location deci-
sion. That is, it appears a spatial dependency in our results. Therefore, it could
be said that the location decision process of intra-EU foreign investment may be
an additional mechanism to explain the decrease in the core-periphery pattern
between EU countries and an increase of the core-periphery pattern within EU
countries.
Two policy concerns appear. Firstly, since country and regional character-
istics di⁄er, the in￿ uence of multinationals￿location determinants, and hence,
their consequences, also vary. Policies aimed at attracting FDI require coop-
eration between national and regional authorities. And secondly, policies to
reduce economic disparities should consider that the location of multinational
￿rms may be an additional mechanism that in￿ uences the pattern of between
and within country disparities.
However, this requires a more precise empirical speci￿cation to test for the
adequate spatial structure. Preliminary results presented in this paper show a
divergent spatial in￿ uence in location determinants of intra-EU foreign projects
but some interpretation problems appear. Future challenges consist on a better
empirical speci￿cation able to account for an appropriate spatial structure in
order to provide a more concise evidence. Also, extensions in the empirical
speci￿cation are planned to be done by including extra-EU foreign investment
projects and by adding characteristics of the ￿rms as location determinants.
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22AUSTRIA 12 40 23 21 20 14 18 15 27 190 3.40 21.11
BELGIUM 37 33 27 39 14 27 24 37 43 281 5.03 31.22
CYPRUS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00
CZECH REPUBLIC 30 38 31 43 47 55 35 46 60 385 6.89 42.78
GERMANY 47 46 30 22 37 22 24 37 40 305 5.46 33.89
DENMARK 8 10 3 2 1 3 9 6 11 53 0.95 5.89
ESTONIA 6 4 8 11 7 8 9 22 11 86 1.54 9.56
SPAIN 41 40 63 53 54 60 50 37 48 446 7.98 49.56
FINLAND 3 5 5 3 9 4 4 4 1 38 0.68 4.22
FRANCE 200 89 156 102 85 72 147 189 135 1175 21.03 130.56
GREECE 0 3 1 1 1 3 0 2 3 14 0.25 1.56
HUNGARY 63 64 43 34 42 50 47 76 57 476 8.52 52.89
IRELAND 26 22 9 6 7 6 9 10 5 100 1.79 11.11
ITALY 13 13 14 13 14 7 5 9 5 93 1.66 10.33
LITHUANIA 9 5 2 3 8 11 2 5 7 52 0.93 5.78
LUXEMBOURG 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 6 0.11 0.67
LATVIA 5 4 1 3 4 5 4 9 6 41 0.73 4.56
MALTA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00
NETHERLANDS 23 13 20 15 11 14 8 8 7 119 2.13 13.22
POLAND 70 65 40 50 22 32 26 72 103 480 8.59 53.33
PORTUGAL 5 12 5 7 14 19 22 17 16 117 2.09 13.00
SWEDEN 14 7 8 9 19 24 19 24 16 140 2.51 15.56
SLOVENIA 2 4 0 0 0 0 1 8 3 18 0.32 2.00
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 7 9 7 13 9 13 15 44 38 155 2.77 17.22
UK 162 141 84 75 45 58 91 81 79 816 14.61 90.67
Total (per year) 783 668 580 525 470 508 570 758 724 5586 100
Source: Author's elaboration on EIM
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23Variable Definition (Source) Sign
Dependent variable (Y) Location choices among 25 countries and 246 regions (EIM).
Independent variables
Country variables
GDP Constant Gross Domestic Product: Euros 1995 (Cambridge Econometrics). +/-
External Market Potential Sum of the GDPs all the other alternative countries weighted by their +
distance to the location choice.
GDP per head Constant Gross Domestic Product: Euros 1995 divided by population. +/-
Population density Population per square kilometer (Cambridge Econometrics). +/-
Wage Labour cost per hour (Cambridge Econometrics). +/-
Unemployment rate Percentage of unemployed over active population (Cambridge Econometrics). +/-
Manufacturing density Total manufacturing employment per square kilometer (Cambridge Econometrics). +/-
Foreign Agglomeration Count plus one of firms location in the same country (EIM). +
Corporate Taxes (Eurostat). -
Governace Index Governace effectiveness index (World Bank). +
Regional variables
GDP Constant Gross Domestic Product: Euros 1995 (Cambridge Econometrics). +/-
External Market Potential Sum of the GDPs all the other alternative regions weighted by their +
distance to the location choice.
GDP per head Constant Gross Domestic Product: Euros 1995 divided by population. +/-
Population density Population per square kilometer (Cambridge Econometrics). +/-
Wage Labour cost per hour (Cambridge Econometrics). +/-
Unemployment rate Percentage of unemployed over active population (Cambridge Econometrics). +/-
Manufacturing density Total manufacturing employment per square kilometer (Cambridge Econometrics). +/-
Foreign Agglomeration Count plus one of firms location in the same region (EIM). +
TABLE 2



















Unemployment rate 0.015 0.013 0.064
(0,052) (0,051) (0,055)


































Unemployment rate -0.01 -0.007 0.037
(0,022) (0,021) (0,026)














2 0.179 0.179 0.064 0.064 0.072
Number of choices 25 25 246 246 246
Number of investors 1,181,292 1,181,292 120,075 120,075 1,181,292





(i) The dependent variable is location choice.
(ii) The symbols (a), (b) and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
(iii) Quantities in parenthesis are the standard errors.
respectively.
25Figure 1: Spatial distribution of MNEs at the country level.
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